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This study presents empirical estimates of the importance of different
characteristics of corporations in influencing the propensity of such cor-
porations to finance their investments by borrowing. It also considers the
determinants of the type of borrowing firms do, by estimating jointly the
determinants of short-term and long-term borrowing. Such analysis is
important because it is difficult to chose among the competing hypotheses
about the determinants of corporate borrowing on the basis of economic
theory alone.
My task is facilitated by a rich data panel based on information on
nearly 200 corporations gathered from several sources, including in-
formation on the composition of the capital stocks of individual firms.
The large number of variables representing firm characteristics facilitates
the evaluation of different models of leverage, while the availability of at
least 9 years of data on each firm allows me to distinguish between
short-run and long-run determinants of borrowing.
The tax law plays a central role in most models of corporate leverage,
and it is recent changes in the tax law that motivate some of the current
interest in the question of what determines corporate borrowing. One
important issue to which much recent attention has been devoted is the
apparently large bias built into the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS) for depreciable assets introduced by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981. According to most calculations, the combination of the
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investment tax credit and either three-year or five-year write-off gave
investments in business equipment deductions and credits that exceeded
in present value the benefits conveyed by immediate expensing. As is well
known, a corporate tax with expensing (and without interest deductibil-
ity) is "neutral" in the sense that it does not distort corporate investment
decisions. Put another way, the effective corporate marginal tax rate on
investment is zero. The presence of tax benefits in excess of expensing
therefore implies the existence of a marginal subsidy, that is, a negative
tax rate. Indeed, the ACRS benefits are so generous that the aggregate
effective tax rate on equipment investment is now essentially zero, after
the introduction in the 1982 tax act of a 50% basis adjustment for
investment credits received (see Hulten and Robertson 1982).
Under the current law, structures do not receive this effective tax
exemption offered to equipment. Though the tax lifetime for most busi-
ness structures (15 years) is now much shorter than before, structures
typically receive no investment tax credits. As a result, estimates suggest
that the effective tax rates on structures now lie below the statutory rate
of 46% (i.e., depreciation allowances are more generous than economic
depreciation) but much closer to this rate than zero (see, e.g., Economic
Report of the President 1982; Hulten and Robertson 1982). Further,
nondepreciable assets, such as land, do not qualify for any investment
incentives comparable to accelerated depreciation or the investment tax
credit.
This suggests that there exists a potentially serious distortion facing the
choice of investment mix by corporations.
1 However, such a conclusion is
necessarily valid only if a separation prevails between real and financial
corporate decisions. Under some models of debt-equity choice, there
may be a tax advantage to the use of debt finance which is dissipated by
other costs to the firm as leverage increases. If these costs relate systema-
tically to the firm's investment mix, one would expect debt-to-equity
ratios to differ for this reason. For example, one could imagine a case in
which leverage costs are lower for structures, with the additional leverage
this would make possible acting to offset the tax disadvantage structures
face on the "real" side.
This is an example of the type of issue I seek to resolve in the analysis
that follows. I begin, in section 8.2, with a brief review of the literature on
optimal financial structure in the presence of taxation, with particular
emphasis on the choice of debt-to-equity ratio. Section 8.3 develops the
different variants of the model of corporate borrowing that will be
estimated. The model shares with its predecessors the weakness of being
an ad hoc model rather than one derived rigorously from a firm's dynamic
optimization problem. However, this seems unavoidable in the current
context, and the model contains enough flexibility to be compatible with
different underlying behavioral hypotheses. Section 8.4 presents a de-303 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
scription of the construction of the dataset and the definitions of the
variables used in the regressions, and section 8.5 presents the regression
results.
8.2 Theories of Corporate Leverage
Most theories of corporate leverage begin with the twin observations
that corporate taxation appears to bias the choice of financial policy
completely toward debt and that corporations typically finance perhaps
only one-quarter of their accumulations of capital by actually issuing
debt.
2 The challenge is to explain why the simple Modigliani-Miller
(1963) "all debt" result does not hold.
One suggested answer was provided by Miller (1977), who argued that
the presence of a progressive personal income tax with favorable treat-
ment of equity income (because of the partial exclusion and deferral
advantage associated with capital gains taxation) would lead to an
equilibrium with firms facing the same cost of capital for debt and equity.
In this equalibrium, the tax advantage to debt would just be offset by a
lower before-tax return to equity holders. This model implies that in
equilibrium, taxation does not alter the original finding of Modigliani and
Miller (1958) that financial policy is irrelevant. Moreover, it offers no
reason why financial policy would relate to real investment decisions or
other characteristics of firms.
Certain fundamental problems with the Miller result have been
pointed out by a number of authors. For example, the implicit tax rate on
municipal debt does not appear to be anywhere near the corporate rate
suggested by the model.
3 Moreover, the portfolios of individual investors
contain both equity and taxable debt rather than exhibiting the segmenta-
tion that Miller's hypothesis would predict. Thus, it seems that certain
additions must be made to Miller's model to explain observed behavior.
Several of the models I consider have in common the property of there
being certain costs faced by firms that increase with leverage, making
interior debt-to-equity ratios optimal in spite of the presence of a partial
tax advantage to debt finance. I consider these models next, discussing
their empirically testable implications.
8.2.1 Bankruptcy/Agency Cost Models
The most basic explanation for interior debt-to-equity ratios is costly
bankruptcy (see, e.g., Scott 1976). It is important to emphasize that the
bankruptcy event must not simply be costly to some security holders in
the sense of causing a redistribution of resources among different classes.
The possibility of such redistributions could be allowed for adequately by
an adjustment of the normal coupon rate on debt. For potential bank-
ruptcy to discourage the issuance of debt, there must be costs to the firm304 Alan J. Auerbach
as a whole, such as legal fees, court costs, or the loss on disposition of
fixed assets (under liquidation). Moreover, these costs must be suffi-
ciently large to be important relative to debt's tax advantage when
bankruptcy is a likely outcome. Empirical evidence tends to refute this
(see, e.g., Miller 1977), if we take the observed frequency of bankruptcy
as a rough probability measure.
In models of imperfect information, or dynamic models in which
financial and investment decisions occur at different times, additional
costs associated with bankruptcy can arise because of the inability of
bondholders to constrain the behavior of corporate managers. In a static
model, it may be difficult for creditors to monitor the behavior of firms
(Ross 1977). In dynamic models, managers may have the incentive to
choose socially inefficient investment plans, because they do not internal-
ize the effects of such plans on the value of outstanding long-term debt
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). For example, firms with high levels of
outstanding long-term debt can choose to undertake very risky projects
that increase the probability of bankruptcy. Under limited corporate
liability, this transfers resources from debtholders to equityholders, and
may do so to a sufficient extent that risky projects with low total payoffs
will dominate (from the equityholders' viewpoint) safer projects with
higher total present value. The inefficiency induced by this moral hazard
is a social cost that, presumably, must be borne by the firm and its owners
ex ante in the form of higher coupon payments to holders of long-term
debt. It would clearly be in the stockholders' interest to constrain the
firm's behavior in order to avoid such costs. While mechanisms to achieve
this do exist (e.g., bond covenants restricting future borrowing), it would
be costly if not impossible to use them to replicate the desired outcome.
If such costs to leverage remain, it may be possible to identify differ-
ences across firms in the level of such costs. For example, Myers (1977)
suggests that the moral hazard problem is more acute for firms whose
value derives from the anticipated rents from future investment opportu-
nities rather than from existing assets or assets which the firm is commit-
ted to purchase. Presumably, there would also be less of a problem for
firms with a narrow range of investment opportunities from which to
choose. A second determinant of the level of agency costs should be the
firm's bankruptcy risk, holding debt level constant. One can model this
using an option-pricing framework by assuming that bankruptcy will
occur if the value of the firm as a whole drops below the level of claims
against the firm. The cost of such a "bankruptcy option" depends,
following the standard option-pricing results (Black and Scholes 1973;
Merton 1973), on the firm's value as well as the variance of its value over
time.
Myers also suggests that the agency problem may give rise to maturity
matching of financial claims and real assets, although he also points out305 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
that the problem could be alleviated if firms engaged only in short-term
borrowing, since debt would always be fully redeemed before the making
of decisions about future projects. One could imagine the occurrence of
either of these practices, but it is more difficult to derive a model that
produces them. One purpose of our empirical analysis is to determine
whether such behavior can actually be detected in practice.
8.2.2 Limited Tax Shield Models
The U.S. corporate income tax treats gains and losses asymmetrically.
Losses may be carried back up to three years to obtain a refund of past
taxes, but the excess of any remaining losses must be carried forward,
without interest, and subject to expiration after 15 years (7 years during
this paper's sample period). Firms without taxable income need not be in
financial distress or on the verge of bankruptcy. However, the prospect of
not being able to use the future tax deductions provided by interest
payments makes debt less attractive, and may cause firms to limit their
leverage. This is the essence of the explanation offered by DeAngelo and
Masulis (1980). It is attractive as an explanation of debt policy because,
unlike bankruptcy or agency costs, tax costs are easily measured.
The hypothesis also has a number of testable implications. First, firms
with substantial loss carry-forwards should, ceteris paribus, choose to
issue less debt. Second, firms investing in assets with a greater fraction of
their total after-tax returns generated by investment tax credits and
depreciation deductions should also use less debt finance. This is seen
most simply if we imagine a project which costs one dollar and lasts for
one period, yielding a gross return /subject to taxation at rate T, after a
depreciation deduction equal to a fraction d of gross rents. If r is the
required after-tax rate of return required by the firm (in addition to the
return of the initial one dollar investment), then the after-tax return
satisfies
(1) (l-
This implies that the firm's taxable income is
(2) /(1a^)(i-
(1 - T) + Ttf
which decreases with d. This result carries over directly to a multiperiod
model if capital decays geometrically and depreciation deductions exceed
actual depreciation by a given fraction of income, say a. In this case,
taxable income as a fraction of capital is a function only of a and not of the
asset's depreciation characteristics.
4 More realistically, effective tax rates
on assets differ not through variations in a but through differences in the
timing of depreciation deductions and qualification for investment tax
credits. Thus, the magnitude of a firm's taxable income will depend not306 Alan J. Auerbach
only on the effective tax rate on the assets it owns but also on their age
structure. For example, a unit of equipment under the original 1981
version of ACRS would receive tax benefits in the first year of service
sufficient to shelter income equal to 37% of the asset's purchase price.
5
On the other hand, this same asset would receive no deductions at all
after five years. Because acceleration of this sort (though not as extreme)
has been present for many years, the fraction of a firm's income sheltered
by deductions and credits will generally increase with the rate at which
the firm accumulates capital, given the firm's capital stock composition.
A final implication of this model of leverage determination is that the
firm's riskiness, this time as measured by the fluctuations of earnings
before interest but after taxes,
6 should also discourage borrowing because
the asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses will lower the expected
tax savings from any given level of debt.
8.2.3 Tax Clientele Models
If the Miller equilibrium holds, each firm will be completely indifferent
in its choice of debt-to-equity ratio. The foregoing models suggest that
asymmetries in the legal treatment of gains and losses, either through
limited corporate liability under bankruptcy or the lack of a loss offset in
the tax law, may cause the Miller result to break down. An additional
reason why this may happen concerns the issue of whether investors can
obtain the same patterns of returns holding either only debt or only
equity. If they cannot, then a firm's financial policy will generally matter
and will affect the welfare of different individuals differently (Auerbach
and King 1983). In this case, the choice of financial policy by a firm acting
"in the interests of its shareholders" depends on who these shareholders
are. Tax clienteles may develop for different firms, with investors in
higher personal tax brackets having a greater relative preference for the
firms they own to finance through retentions rather than borrowing
(Auerbach 1984). Put another way, such investors would rather borrow
on their own account than have firms do it for them, if their personal tax
rate is sufficiently high. Since most equity finance comes through retained
earnings, this suggests that a corporation facing increasing costs to lever-
age will use less debt finance, the higher is the tax rate of its clientele.
8.2.4 Summary
There are several empirical implications of the foregoing models about
overall debt-to-equity ratios. Risky firms should borrow less, whether
risk is measured by fluctuations in valuation or in earnings. Fast-growing
firms should borrow less because of their higher ratio of growth opportu-
nities to existing capital and because of their greater tax shield from
depreciation deductions and investment tax credits. Firms investing in
assets receiving generous tax treatment, such as equipment, generally,307 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
relative to structures and land, should use less debt for the same reason.
Firms with high-tax clienteles should use less debt than others.
I have more limited predictions about the maturity structure of debt
that firms will choose. If firms engage in maturity matching, one would
expect to see a smaller fraction of long-term debt used to finance equip-
ment, which typically depreciates more rapidly. One might also expect
that firms eschewing long-term debt for agency reasons would shift to
short-term debt rather than equity finance. Particularly with respect to
the question of maturity structure, it is important that the model I
estimate has the capacity to separate long-term determinants of leverage
from those that may dominate borrowing decisions in the short run.
8.3 A Model of Corporate Borrowing
My approach differs from that taken in much of the literature on financial
decisions in two major respects. I model the borrowing by individual
firms as a continuous process. That is, my model attempts to explain
changes in levels of debt rather than discrete new issues. This seems
appropriate for firms as large as those in the sample. I also express all
variables in real terms, corrected for inflation. The process by which such
variables were obtained from book value data is described in the next
section. My model is similar in some respects to that estimated by Taggart
(1977) using quarterly aggregate time-series data. However, there are
several important differences and allowances for the ability to distinguish
effects across firms as well as over time. I estimate both a single-equation
model for all debt and a two-equation model to explain short-term and
long-term debt.
The basic model is intended to capture three characterizations of firms'
borrowing behavior: (1) a long-run target debt-equity ratio based on the
factors outlined in section 8.2; (2) a lag in adjustment to changes in this
desired ratio; and (3) the short-run importance of cash flow constraints.
To illustrate the interaction of these points, consider a firm with a major
tax loss carry-forward that wishes to undertake an investment project.
This firm may wish to use only retained earnings, but sufficient earnings
may not be available, particularly as the loss carry-forward probably
indicates low cash flow as well as low taxable income. Hence, we might
observe this firm borrowing more in the short run than would be pre-
dicted by the underlying attractiveness of debt finance. It is important
that the model allow such borrowing to be distinguished from borrowing
based on longer-term considerations. A simple cross-section regression
would not be capable of separating such factors.
I outline first the model of aggregate firm borrowing. The long-run
desired debt-to-assets ratio b* is taken to be a linear function of several
variables. These variables vary over time, over firms, or over both time308 Alan J. Auerbach
and firms. I assume that firms borrow to close part of the gap between the
current ratio of debt to assets and the desired one,
7 but also are influenced
by current cash flow needs. I define this cash flow deficit as the change in
the firm's debt-to-assets ratio that would be required for the firm to
finance its new investment out of internal funds and borrowing, while at
the same time maintaining dividends at their trend level and avoiding the
issuance of new shares. The motivation for this variable is that both new
share issues and dividend cuts are activities generally taken to be costly to
the firm: the former because of tax considerations, the latter because of
the undesirable signal it may convey.
8
The cash flow deficit variable is constructed by subtracting from the
sum of gross investment and trend dividends
9 (uses) the sum of after-tax
cash flow (after-tax earnings plus depreciation) and the product of the
current debt-to-assets ratio and gross investment (sources), and dividing
the difference by assets. This variable equals zero when investment and
trend dividends can be exactly covered by internal funds plus borrowing
at the current debt-to-assets ratio. If it is positive, an increase in the
debt-to-assets ratio will be needed if dividend cuts and new share issues
are to be avoided.
This variable differs from the standard "external deficit" variable in its
inclusion of trend rather than actual dividends. Moreover, it includes
borrowing at the current debt-to-asset ratio on the sources side because
the partial adjustment model is expressed in debt-to-asset ratios rather
than in levels of debt. Formulating the model in this way allows us to
distinguish between increases in the level of debt as the firm grows and
fluctuations around this trend that result in changes in the incentives to
use debt finance.
10
The basic model, then, is of the form
(3) ^bit = \o{bft-bit^) + lofit,
where fit is the firm's deficit as just defined, bit is the firm's ratio of debt to
assets (the latter equal to its fixed capital stock plus working capital), and
(4) b?t = a0-xit
is the firm's long-run target debt-assets ratio based on the determinants
x
it
The model that distinguishes between the ratio of long-term debt to
assets (€) and that of short-term debt to assets (s) has two equations of a
form similar to (3):
(5a) A€;, = \1(€f, -€,-,_!)
(5b) Asit = X2(€f, - €„_!)309 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
where each equation includes not only its own gap between desired and
actual levels but that from the other equation. Similarly, I define €* and
s* by
(6a) €?t = a1-xit
(6b) s?t = a2'Xit
Because I make no prior distinction between the variables determining
€* and those determining s *, the vectors a1 and a2 can not be identified
using equations (5a) or (5b) alone (unless the cross-effects §i and X2 are
zero). However, they are exactly identified by the equations together.
Further, since the two equations have the same set of explanatory vari-
ables, maximum likelihood estimation of the system is accomplished by
performing ordinary least squares on the equations separately.
The vector xit includes dummy variables for each firm and for each year
(save the last). The former are included to account for interfirm differ-
ences in the desired ratio of debt to assets, while the latter are intended to
pick up year-to-year differences in the incentive to borrow that are
common across firms, as might be caused by macroeconomic fluctuations
(e.g., changes in the inflation rate or the term structure). Indeed, an
interesting side result of the estimation procedure is the pattern of these
dummy variables over time.
Also available are many other measures of firm attributes, but most of
these either are constant or change slowly over the sample period,
making it impossible to include them in regressions along with the indi-
vidual firm effects. Only the firm's tax loss carry-forward has sufficient
year-to-year variance to be included in the initial estimation procedure.
The remainder, however, may be used in a second estimation stage to
explain the variation in the individual firm constants in a cross-section
regression. The need for this two-stage procedure would be obviated if
the firm dummies were omitted from the first estimation stage and the
various firm characteristics were included in the vector x directly. How-
ever, such a procedure would introduce a large, firm-specific error (equal
to the unexplained part of the firm's own fixed effect) that would likely be





The data used in this paper come from three sources. The basic data on
firms come from a copy of the COMPUSTAT tape covering the years
1958-77. From this tape, I selected those firms for which all observations
of a subset of key variables were available. Long-term debt corresponds310 Alan J. Auerbach
to the COMPUSTAT category of all debt maturing in more than one
year. Short-term debt also includes long-term debt maturing within one
year. Total assets equals fixed capital, plus inventories, plus other current
assets net of nondebt current liabilities. (An alternative approach to the
measurement of total assets is to use the total market value of equity plus
debt. This is discussed below in section 8.5.) Balance sheet and income
statement data on long-term debt, capital, inventories, and earnings were
corrected from book value through a series of steps described in detail in
Auerbach (1984). I review these steps briefly below.
Long-term debt was converted to market value using assumptions
about the initial age structure of such debt in 1958, the maturity of new
issues, and the coupon rate on such issues. From this corrected data
series, I calculated the change in the market value of outstanding long-
term debt due to interest fluctuations, adding this plus the inflation gain
on net financial liabilities (long-term debt plus short-term debt less finan-
cial assets) to book earnings.
Inventories were corrected according to information on the primary
method of inventory accounting used by each firm. The inventory valua-
tion adjustment so obtained was subtracted from book earnings to correct
for their inclusion of excess inventory profits.
Depreciation was estimated by assuming that book depreciation is
correct except for the fact that it is based on initial asset prices. The
method used calculates that rate of declining balance (exponential) de-
preciation, 8, that, when applied to a perpetual inventory calculation for
updating capital stocks beginning with the 1958 book value for net fixed
capital, yields the stated 1977 book value. (If all assets actually were
written off, and did depreciate, at a single rate, this calculation would
yield the correct rate.) Using this estimate of 8,1 generated a corrected
series for capital stocks and depreciation using the perpetual inventory
method, starting in 1958. As with debt and inventories, the difference
between corrected and book depreciation was subtracted from book
earnings. The measure of corrected cash flow entering into the computa-
tion of the cash flow deficit / is simply the sum of corrected after-tax
profits plus corrected depreciation.
After such corrections, all variables were deflated to be expressed in
constant dollars rather than current dollars. Each firm's earnings growth
rate was estimated by fitting a quadratic trend over the period 1963-77 for
the firm's corrected earnings, before interest but after taxes, and taking
the growth rate along this trend at the sample midpoint, 1970. The
variance of firm earnings was approximated by the sample variance
around this trend, normalized by the squared trend value in 1970.
A second source of data is the actual 10K reports filed by the individual
firms. These reports contain more detailed information than is provided
by COMPUSTAT. In particular, many firms list separate capital stocks,311 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
depreciation, and investment for several classes of capital. The most
detailed common breakdown is transportation equipment, other equip-
ment, structures, and land, with some firms aggregating the first two and
last two of these categories. Firms that did not provide uninterrupted
data between 1969 and 1977, or that did not follow this general asset
classification, were omitted from the sample. For the remainder, dis-
aggregated, corrected capital stocks were created following the perpetual
inventory method described above, using 1968 and 1977 net capital stocks
and investment and depreciation reported for the intervening years. Such
capital stocks were not used directly but were divided by their annual sum
to generate capital stock fractions. These fractions were averaged over
time for each firm and used in the second estimation stage as explanatory
variables.
Of the 189 firms for which capital stocks by asset category were com-
puted, 149 have separate categories for land and structures, while 40
combine the two into a single category. Forty firms report separate
statistics for transportation equipment, while the remaining firms lump
all equipment together. The average capital stock depreciation rates
derived for each category appear realistic, though there is substantial
variance in these rates across firms. The summary statistics for these
depreciation rates are reported in table 8.1. (It should be remembered
that the equipment category includes all equipment for 149 firms and that
the structures category includes land as well for 40 firms.) The category
means are quite consistent with estimates of economic depreciation
found in the literature (see, e.g. Hulten and Wykoff 1981).
In the regression reported in this paper, I omit the firms for which no
structure/land breakdown is available and add together the equipment
categories for those firms reporting transportation equipment separately.
This leaves 143 firms in the final sample.
1
2
The final source of data is the CRSP tape, which provided daily return
and dividend data. In an earlier paper (Auerbach 1983), I performed a
series of regressions on daily data for each of the firms in our sample,
using observations for every tenth trading day between 1963 and 1977
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plus all days on which the firm's common stock went ex dividend. The
regressions were of the form
(7) gr = e0 + e1^ + e2mf + e3rf,
where gt and dt are the stock's capital gains per dollar of stock and
dividend per dollar, respectively, and mt and rt are the rate of change in
the Standard and Poor's Index and the Treasury bill rate. This equation
derives from a version of the capital asset pricing model with progressive
personal taxes, with 82 a measure of the firm's "beta." The term Q1 ought
to be -1 in the absence of taxes. Over the sample of firms for which (7)
was estimated, Gx has an average of - .787. Under certain assumptions,
this divergence may be attributed to the differential taxation of dividends
and capital gains, and the variation in Q1 across firms may be traced to
differences in tax clienteles.
1
3 The estimated values of (Q1 + 1) and 02 are
used in the present paper as estimates of the clientele tax rate and beta of
each firm. To estimate the variance in value for each firm, I take the
variance over this same sample (excluding ex dividend days) of each
firm's proportional capital gains, gt, which yields a normalized measure of
the variance of the firm's equity value, and multiply it by the sample ratio
of equity to debt plus equity for the firm, yielding an overall volatility
measure analogous to the "unlevered" beta.
8.5 Estimation Results
For convenience, I rewrite the one-equation and two-equation models
here:
One equation:










The measure of total assets by which I divide measures of debt to form
ratios includes corrected book values of both fixed capital and working
capital, as described in section 8.4. However, one could argue that an
alternative, market-value-based measure is preferable, one that simply
adds up the value of all claims against the firm, including common and
preferred stock, long-term debt, and short-term debt. The benefit of313 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
using the second method is that it may more accurately reflect the value of
a firm's debt than any measure based on book values, even "corrected"
ones. For example, a firm with energy-intensive plant and equipment
would suffer a loss in value if energy prices rose unexpectedly, because
the discounted value of the quasi rents anticipated to flow from its assets
would fall. If measured properly, this would appear as capital stock
depreciation, but such a measure is difficult to obtain except indirectly
through market valuation. Similarly, a firm with large amounts of income
from intangibles (goodwill, patents, monopoly rents, etc.) may have a
comprehensive stock of income-generating assets much larger than the
measured capital stock. Arguing against the use of the value-based
method is the uncertainty about the equilibrium ratio of market value to
the correctly measured value of assets. This amounts to a question about
the long-run value of Tobin's q. For example, under a Miller-type
equilibrium with retained earnings serving as the marginal source of
finance, firms would be indifferent in their choice of debt-to-equity ratio
but the value of debt plus equity would increase with leverage (Auerbach
1979).
1
4 In addition, it is unclear how much firms react to volatile year-to-
year fluctuations in value in determining desired levels of debt.
Since each of these methods of defining assets has arguments in its
favor, I estimated regressions for both the book-based (method 1) and
market-based (method 2) asset measures. The results for the first estima-
tion were relatively similar, so only those for method 1 are discussed in
the text. These are shown in table 8.2. (An analogue to table 8.2 for
method II is presented and discussed in the appendix.)
The attribute vector, x , includes firm dummies, time dummies, and the
previous year's tax loss carry-forward.
1
5 The estimates are for the period
1969-77, for which data on all variables described above were available.
The first column of table 8.2 shows the estimates for the single-
equation model, while the second and third present the reduced-form
estimates for the two-equation model. An interesting feature of all three
regressions is the relatively large size of the coefficient on the own lagged
variable—the annual adjustment speed. These speeds, 27.4% per year
for all debt, 30.4% for long-term debt, and 73.8% for short-term debt are
particularly large given that they relate not to levels of debt but ratios of
debt to assets. A second point is that the cross-effects between long-term
and short-term debt are both positive and significant, indicating a substi-
tutability of the two forms of finance. The cash flow deficit is insignificant
in all three equations, a somewhat surprising result. It suggests, for
example, that a drop in cash flow, holding investment constant, will not
affect borrowing independently of other factors. This is rather implausi-
ble, and suggests that a more elaborate specification would be useful. The
tax loss carry-forward is negative in all three regressions, as predicted,
and significant in the first two.314 Alan J. Auerbach
From the estimates in table 8.2, I can solve for the annual desired
debt-to-asset ratios for any firm. As a representative example, I consider
a firm with no cash flow deficit and no tax loss carry-forward, and with a
firm effect equal to the mean of such effects over firms (shown in table
8.2).




Lagged long-term debt (€)
Lagged short-term debt (s)
Cash flow deficit (f)











































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.315 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
Table 8.3 Estimated Desired Debt-to-Assets Ratios
All Long-Term Short-Term
Borrowing (&*) Borrowing (€*) Borrowing (s*) (€* + s*)














































Note: Calculated for a firm with mean fixed effect and no cash flow deficit or tax loss
carry-forward.
The estimated targets, b*, €*, and s* for debt in each sample year are
shown in table 8.3.
1
6 The numbers are reasonable in magnitude compared
to observed aggregate debt-to-asset ratios. None of the three series shows
any noticeable trend over the period, and the estimates tend to move
together. An indication that the aggregate equation fits reasonably well
relative to the two-equation system comes from the fact that the sum of
the estimated values of s* and €* is generally very close to b*. The
year-to-year movements reflect those actually observed in the aggregate
(see, e.g., the statistics in Robert Taggart's paper in this volume), such as
the decline in leverage from 1973 to 1975 and increase thereafter to 1977.
However, the movements from year to year in table 8.3 are larger in
magnitude, since they reflect changes in long-run targets rather than
actually attained values.
I turn next to the second stage of my estimation, that of explaining
differences in the desired debt-to-assets ratios of different firms using firm
characteristics. I perform cross-section regressions for long-term debt,
short-term debt, and all debt, with the dependent variables in the regres-
sion being the estimated structural coefficient of the firm's dummy vari-
able in the expressions for €*, s*, and b*, respectively. Because the two
methods of defining total assets (corrected book vs. market value) pro-
vide somewhat different results, I present both sets, in tables 8.4 and 8.5,
respectively. The explanatory variables in each table, all described
above, are "unlevered" variances of firm value and earnings, the firm's
"clientele tax rate" estimated from ex dividend day regressions, the
estimated rate of depreciation of the firm's capital stock, and variables
reflecting the composition of the firm's assets. For the first definition of
assets (corrected book value) I include the fraction of fixed capital
accounted for by structures, equipment, and land (which sum to one),
multiplied by the ratio of fixed capital to total assets. This yields the316 Alan J. Auerbach
Table 8.4 Firm Characteristics and Borrowing
All Long-Term Short-Term
Dependent Variable Borrowing (b*) Borrowing (€*) Borrowing (s*)
(Firm Effect) (4.1) (4.2) (4.3)
Constant (xA)









































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
fraction that each component of fixed capital accounts for of the firm's
total assets, fixed and current. The coefficients of these fractions may be
interpreted as the optimal debt-to-assets ratio for the particular type of
asset, relative to that for current assets. When the market-value-based
measure of assets is used, I must adopt some convention for allocating the
difference between market value and the value of assets carried over
from the first measure. I choose to allocate the entire difference to
intangible assets previously unaccounted for, and include in the regres-
sion the fraction of the new capital stock measure represented by good-
will. (The remaining three fractions, for structures, land, and equipment,
are scaled up or down accordingly.) This fraction has a highly significant
and negative coefficient in all three regressions reported in table 8.5. The
absolute value of the coefficient on goodwill is nearly as large as that of
the constant in the aggregate regression, indicating that very little debt is
used to finance goodwill, as I have measured it. This may be interpreted317 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
Table 8.5 Firm Characteristics and Borrowing (Alternative Assets Definition)
All Long-Term Short-Term
Dependent Variable Borrowing (b*) Borrowing (€*) Borrowing (s*)
(Firm Effect) (5.1) (5.2) (5.3)
Independent variable:
Constant (xA)
















































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
in at least two ways. One may take it as an indication that firms finance
intangible assets with less debt, in accordance with the theory of agency
(at least to the extent that the intangibles indicate more discretion on the
part of the firm's managers). On the other hand, this finding may also
reflect the possibility that managers base their borrowing decisions on
book asset measures (perhaps corrected for inflation) but not on stock
market values.
Except for the asset composition variables, the explanatory variables
have very similar coefficients in the two tables, although they are not
necessarily consistent with the predictions of the various theories dis-
cussed in section 8.2. The clientele tax rate variable is always insignifi-
cant, which may reflect on its quality as a tax rate proxy. The growth rate318 Alan J. Auerbach
and variance of earnings always have positive coefficients, usually signifi-
cant. Neither of these results has an obvious explanation. The rate of
capital depreciation always exerts a positive effect, which also was not
predicted. However, this effect is only significant for short-term borrow-
ing, consistent with the notion of maturity matching. The variance of
value does perform as predicted, but never significantly so. All in all,
these results provide rather negative evidence with respect to all of the
theories of leverage presented above.
The coefficients of the capital stock fractions differ considerably be-
tween tables 8.4 and 8.5, presumably because of the inclusion in the latter
table of the goodwill fraction. When the first, corrected book measure of
assets is used, only equipment has a significant coefficient, which is
positive. When goodwill is added both to th§ measure of assets and to the
regression as a fraction of the new asset measure, the coefficient of
structures becomes significantly negative and that of land significantly
positive. While there is no indication that structures are financed with
greater leverage than equipment, the instability of these results is quite
disturbing. Given that the allocation of the entire difference between
market and corrected book values to goodwill is arbitrary and not neces-
sarily appropriate, it is quite difficult to draw conclusions here.
8.6 Conclusion
Our partial adjustment models of borrowing suggest rapid speeds of
adjustment, particularly for short-term debt, and desired ratios of debt,
and its long-term and short-term components, to assets during the period
1969-77 that, while not constant, exhibit no obvious trend. Some firm
characteristics are insignificant in explaining cross-sectional differences
in leverage, while others appear to contradict the prediction of various
theories in their effects. The effects of firm growth rates on the level of
borrowing is inconsistent with the predictions of "agency" models of
leverage. The positive effects of earnings variance on borrowing appear
to contradict the "tax shield" borrowing model, but the tax loss carryfor-
ward has the negative effect that this model would predict.
The results do not indicate that firms borrow more to invest in struc-
tures than in equipment, but the results here vary substantially according
to the measure of assets used. Richer models of firm behavior appear to
be required before more definitive conclusions can be reached.319 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
Appendix
This Appendix presents in table 8A. 1 the first-stage estimation results for
the alternative definition of firm assets, based on market value rather




Lagged long-term debt (€)
Lagged short-term debt (s)
Cash flow deficit (/)











































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses.320 Alan J. Auerbach
than corrected book value. The only important difference is in the
significant coefficients in all three equations of the cash flow deficit, which
had insignificant coefficients in all three equations in table 8.2. One
suspects that this result is attributable to firm's ignoring short-run fluctua-
tions in value. For example, a large decline in the value of the firm would
increase the cash flow gap, since "normal" debt increases (the current
debt to assets ratio multiplied by the change in assets) would be negative.
At the same time, the observed change in the debt-to-assets ratio would
be positive, even if there were no change in the level of debt, because of
the decline in the value of assets. It is difficult in this model to distinguish
between the hypothesis that firms simply ignore changes in value and the
hypothesis that the reduction in desired debt is just offset by the increase
in the cash flow deficit. To sort out this problem, one would need a model
that disaggregates different sources of the cash flow deficit.
Notes
1. A justification for the use of effective tax rates in welfare analysis is given by
Auerbach (1982).
2. Such a fraction is typical of the time-series debt-to-capital ratios calculated by Gordon
and Malkiel (1981).
3. Gordon and Malkiel (1981) present results suggesting a value between .2 and .3, vs. a
corporate tax rate (historically) of at least .46.
4. This follows from the fact that the user cost of capital to which the marginal product of
capital will be set equals
c = q{r + 8) 11 -
 vr+s '1/(1 - T) ,
where q is the relative capital goods price. Therefore, taxable income as a fraction of assets,
{cK-hqK)lqK, equals [T/(1 - T)]r(l - a).
5. This results from a 15% deduction and a 10% investment tax credit, which shields
income of 22%.
6. One would subtract not taxes actually paid but those that would be paid by the firm
were it entirely financed by equity.
7. This partial adjustment specification imposes a common, geometric lag structure on
the different determinants of the desired ratio of debt to assets. Further research on this
topic might consider more general lag specifications to determine whether these restrictions
are justified.
8. These points are quite common in literature. See, e.g., Auerbach (1984).
9. Trend dividends are calculated by regressing the firm's annual dividends on a con-
stant, time and time squared over the period 1963-77.
10. An alternative approach, used in an earlier version of this paper, would be to
detrend levels of debt.
11. Additional problems of inconsistency could arise if the remaining errors for each
firm were correlated over time, even after being purged of fixed effects. An attempt to
control for this using two-stage least squares, with the lagged debt-to-assets ratios and cash
flow deficit variables regressed in the first stage on several lagged values of the firm's sales
proved unsuccessful, in that the sales variables proved to be very poor instruments. No321 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
other obvious candidates came to mind. Given the rapid adjustment speeds found in the
basic model (table 8.2) and the usual tendency of positive autocorrelation to bias such
speeds downward, one may hope that the potential problem is not a serious one here.
12. There are 149 firms with complete capital stock data (see table 8.1) but six had
missing values for one of the other explanatory variables, the tax loss carry-forward.
13. These interpretations are not universally accepted. See the criticisms of Miller and
Scholes (1982), for example.
14. This occurs because a firm's equity is valued at qD {A - B), where A is the value of a
firm's assets, B the value of its debt, and qD is a constant less than one, based on the relative
tax rates on dividends and capital gains.
15. In a few cases in which this value was missing, I used the one from two years before.
16. Note that to obtain i* and s*, one must solve for the structural parameters in ax and
a2 in (6) from the reduced-form estimates of the two-equation system for £ and s.
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Comment Roger H. Gordon
The various existing theories which attempt to explain the determinants
of corporate financial policy all have implications for how debt-to-value
ratios ought to vary across firms. Yet surprisingly little work has been
done to examine the consistency of the data with these forecasts and to
estimate how responsive actual behavior is to various factors. In this
paper, Auerbach, attempts to fill this gap, discussing theoretically what
the various theories imply and then testing empirically how useful the
theoretically implied factors are in forecasting a firm's financial policy.
While much work remains to be done, the paper makes a valuable
contribution. Its value, though, is more in laying out the questions and
describing associations in the data than in estimating the real determi-
nants of corporate leverage. Most of the variables used to forecast
financial policy are statistically endogenous, making interpretation of the
estimates difficult. (Auerbach does in fact find the coefficient estimates
very difficult to interpret.) Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to
avoid these problems. Auerbach used instruments for dividend policy
and attempted unsuccessfully to do so for the lagged dependent variable
and the cash flow measure. However, the problems are pervasive, as the
Roger H. Gordon is associate professor of economics at the University of Michigan and a
research associate of the NBER.323 Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage
actual level of debt affects many of the observed characteristics of the
firm.
To give a sense of the magnitude of the problem, I will discuss a
number of the variables in turn:
1
1. Lagged debt. To the degree that the true residuals are autocorre-
lated, this coefficient is biased upward. As sizable autocorrelation is to be
expected in such time series, the coefficient estimate can only serve to
give a lower bound, on the adjustment speed.
2. Cashflow deficit. This variable equals gross investment, times one
minus the current debt-to-assets ratio, plus dividends minus after-tax
earnings and depreciation. The debt-to-assets ratio is the dependent
variable, so endogenous. Taxes are endogenous, as taxes depend on
interest deductions. Profits are measured net of interest costs then ad-
justed to reflect the revaluation of existing debt, so are made endoge-
nous. Investment and the debt-to-assets ratio can be correlated for a
variety of reasons beyond those motivating the use of the cash flow
deficit. Auerbach does use trend dividends rather than current dividends,
but makes no attempt to handle the other problems.
3. Tax loss carry-forward. A substantial tax loss carry-forward indi-
cates the presence of too much debt—with a large tax loss carry-forward,
debt is dominated by equity for tax as well as agency cost reasons. This
positive association with the existing debt-to-assets ratio, contrary to the
negative association expected by Auerbach, may be controlled for,
though, by also including the lagged dependent variable.
4. Variance of value. This variable equals the variance in the rate of
return to equity multiplied by (the square of?) one minus the existing
debt-to-value ratio. This use of the dependent variable creates en-
dogeneity.
5. Variance of earnings. Earnings are measured net of real payments
to debtholders. The larger the existing debt is, presumably the larger is
the variability of earnings.
Auerbach's estimated coefficients are also biased due to measurement
error in several of the variables. One potentially serious source of prob-
lems in the Compustat data is the handling of mergers and acquisitions.
The tape flags only major changes, though Auerbach does not mention
excluding even these cases. When mergers occur, variables such as the
earnings growth rate, the variance in earnings, and depreciation rates, as
measured based on growth in the capital stock, will all be badly biased.
The large standard deviations of the depreciation rates in table 8.1, for
example, a standard deviation of 0.1 for the depreciation rate of land
when the mean rate is only 0.025, suggest such problems. Since mergers
are frequently financed by large amounts of borrowing, spurious correla-
tions in the data are also created.
Another major problem is the measurement of the firm's assets. Au-324 Alan J. Auerbach
erbach tries two different measures, but unfortunately the resulting sets
of coefficient estimates differ substantially. Few inferences remain un-
changed between the two versions. Auerbach does not always point out
the sharp differences, as in the time pattern of the debt-to-assets ratio.
My own feeling is that market value provides a much better measure of
Kit than does the replacement cost of physical capital. The former mea-
sure captures the effects of such events as changes in interest rates, in
relative factor prices, in relative output prices, in technology, and so on.
It also includes the value of such assets as brand name, patents, and
future growth opportunities, assets omitted in any replacement cost
measure.
Both measures, though, have substantial measurement error. For ex-
ample, Auerbach estimates the market value of long-term bonds by
assuming that all new long-term bonds are 20-year bonds, not subject to
being called, and always as risky as the representative Baa bond. While
these assumptions may seem at least as good as any of the simple alterna-
tives, each assumption could be substantially in error, and the estimate of
market value could differ substantially from actual market value. Also,
by necessity, the measure of debt excludes such obligations as unfunded
pension liabilities and noncapitalized leases, yet these obligations are
very similar to traditional debentures and potentially quite large. In
measuring the value of fixed assets, Auerbach assumes that the replace-
ment cost of capital in 1958 equals the reported book value of capital.
This underestimate of capital in 1958 will bias downward the trend in
debt-to-assets ratios.
Finally, let me comment on the measurement of the growth rate and
the variability in earnings. The growth rate variable is intended to capture
the idea of Myers that firms whose value derives more from future growth
opportunities ought to use less debt. The natural way to measure this
growth rate would seem to be the growth rate in the replacement value of
the firm's capital stock, for which data are already available. The esti-
mated growth rate in earnings contains a lot of noise and should be
heavily affected by the timing of recessions in the sample period and by
when large deductions were taken.
Taken together, there are enough sources of bias that we should not be
surprised that the coefficient estimates differ from those suggested by the
theories. Much difficult work remains in refining the empirical tests
before we can begin to judge the correspondence between the theories
and actual behavior.
Note
1. Unless the remaining right-hand-side variables are independent of these variables, all
the coefficients will be biased.